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Abstract
This paper examines Beckers thesis that the hypothesis that choices maximise expected utility
relative to xed and universal tastes provides a general framework for the explanation of behaviour.
Three di¤erent models of preference revision are presented and their scope evaluated. The rst,
the classical conditioning model, explain all changes in preferences in terms of changes in the
information held by the agent, holding fundamental beliefs and desires xed. The second, the
Je¤rey conditioning model, explains them in terms of changes in both the information held by the
agent and changes in her prior beliefs, holding her fundamental desires xed. The nal model, that
of generalised conditioning, allows for explanations in terms of changes in the values of all three
variables.
1 De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum
Gary Becker famously described the economic method as . . . the combined assumptions of maximising
behaviour, market equilibrium and stable preferences, used relentlessly and uninchingly [2]. As a
denition of economics, this characterisation is undoubtedly too narrow: many economists work on
non-market interactions and/or use models which assume bounded rationality for instance. It may
have more legitimacy as a description of prevailing practice in neoclassical economics, at least with
regard to the assumption of stable preferences1 , but even in this respect Beckers claim is a little
misleading, however, or can mislead if one doesnt pay attention to actual economic modelling, because
economists do not typically assume that all preferences are stable. Rather some subset of agents
preferences, those dened with respect to a set of nal outcomes, are xed by the model, while others
are allowed (in principle at least) to vary. An agents preferences over her option set, for instance, are
bound to vary if the information set she uses to determine their expected utilities changes for some
reason. And however important models assuming perfect information or xed information sets may
have been historically no economist would regard them as exhaustive of their discipline. Furthermore,
most economists would regard the assumption of stable nal preferences as a methodological heuristic
1As Robert Pollak [12] remarked at the time when Becker was writing those who favour incorporating taste formation
and change into economic analysis fall into two groups whose intersection is almost empty. In the rst group he classed
the work of Radical economists on the ideological and institutional determinants of preferences and other evaluative
attitudes; in the second, economists like himself interested in the dynamics of household consumption. The situation is
rather di¤erent now, where the growth of elds like behavioural and evolutionary economics has generated new interest
in preference change (see for instance, Bowles [5]).
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that simplies the modelling problem and renders it susceptible to mathematical treatment rather than
as a substantial empirical hypothesis. the thought would be that if a model is constructed sensibly the
outcomes that it treats as nal will be ones with respect to which preferences can be assumed to be
su¢ ciently stable for the purposes at hand.
There remains the question of whether there is some level of description of possible outcomes or
states of the world with respect to which agentspreferences are truly invariant. Both positive and
negative views on this question abound. It seems essential to classical Utilitarianism, for instance, that
the preference for pain over pleasure should be both universal and stable: this is what makes quantities
of pleasure the right currency for moral accounting. Where arguments arise, and this surely is what
matters in practical terms, is whether what makes for pleasure and pain stays the same. If classical
Utilitarians tended to assume that it did, we nd in Mills idea of the cultivation of taste a recognition
of their socio-historical variability. The tension between these views has outlived the dispute amongst
Utilitarians. Who of us does not recognise both the force of the empirical evidence for disparate social
and biological determinants of preference and the important normative role that the idea of ultimate
preferences plays in practical deliberation and the evaluation of potential institutional arrangements?
Becker is, in many ways, the modern standard bearer for the classical Utilitarian position:
... one does not argue over tastes for the same reason that one does not argue over
the Rocky Mountains - both are there, will be there next year, too, and are the same to all
men- (Becker and Stigler [1, p. 24]).
The tastes referred to here are what might be called fundamental preferences - i.e. preferences over
the set of ultimate ends that Becker terms commodities - in contrast to derivative preferences, and in
particular those that are directly revealed in the choices that agents make, whose values derive from
their relationship to the ultimate ends. The distinction between fundamental and instrumental value is
a very common one, of course, not only in economics, but in the other social sciences and philosophy
as well, and can be lled out with di¤erent specications of the fundamental ends and of the nature of
the relation between the derived values and the fundamental ones (the connection may be conceived
as causal, evidential or even symbolic, for instance). What is distinctive about Beckers position is
that adds not only a detailed view about the connection between ends (commodities) and the means
(the production function), but also the hypothesis that fundamental preferences are both invariant and
universal.
Appearances in the quote not withstanding, Becker is not making a substantial or empirical claim
about tastes, but rather a methodological one; the essence of which is that assuming xed tastes
disciplines the manner in which expected utility theory is applied to the explanation of behaviour. The
explanatory strategy he advocates closely resembles that used by Bayesians to explain belief change;
indeed the two are closely connected. Bayesians think of an agents beliefs as being jointly determined
by her prior beliefs and the information she holds and changes in her beliefs as being explained by
changes in information, holding the priors xed (in a sense which will be made more precise later on).
Similarly Becker thinks that changes in the observed behaviour of an agent are to be explained in terms
of changes in the factors determining her expectations of utility - information, stocks of personal and
social capital, time, prices, etc. - relative to xed tastes. The main advantage of this approach is that
it tells researchers how to frame their explanations in a non ad hoc way i.e. in a manner which does
not require the postulation of unveriable taste changes.
It is not my intention in this paper to examine these methodological claims in their entirety. Rather
my focus will be in the prior question of whether (or to what extent) Beckers claim that all variation in
behaviour can be described in terms of changes in expectations relative to xed tastes can be vindicated.
To this end I will state his hypothesis in a somewhat more abstract language and then consider three
di¤erent models of preference revision. All three conceive of an agents choices, and more generally her
preferences, as being (at least partially) determined by her beliefs and desires and her beliefs as being
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Figure 1: The Derivation of Preference
(at least partially) determined by the information she holds. These dependencies can be represented
diagrammatically as in Figure 1.
Where the three model di¤er is with regard to the kinds of changes that they countenance. The rst,
the classical conditioning model, attempts to explain all changes in derived beliefs and preferences in
terms of changes in the information held by the agent, holding fundamental or prior beliefs and desires
xed. The second, the Je¤rey conditioning model, attempts to explain them in terms of changes in
both the information held by the agent and changes in her prior beliefs, holding her fundamental desires
xed. The nal model, that of generalised conditioning, allows for explanations in terms of changes in
the values of all three variables.
My aim in this paper will be to examine the scope of the each model, attempting to specify in precise
terms their domain of application. I will argue that the rst model does not provide an adequate basis
for explaining all preference change and hence that the xed tastes hypothesis must be framed within
a more general account of belief change than the classical Bayesian one. My conclusions with regard
to the adequacy of the second model are much more tentative. I will argue that it is possible that all
preference change can be explained in terms of Je¤rey conditioning, but only if the space of prospects is
su¢ ciently rich. Finally, in the main result of the paper, I will prove that the third model is completely
general in the sense that any change in an agents attitudes can be explained within the framework that
it provides.
2 Framework
States of Mind In the approach taken here we think of an agents preferences for prospects
as being determined, and hence explained, by her state of mind - her degrees of partial belief and
desire. Prospects are modelled as subsets of a set of fundamental states of the world, 
 = f!1;!2;:::g.
The states in 
 play the role of the ultimate ends of agents; states whose descriptions are maximally
specic with respect to all matters of concern to them and hence whose desirabilities are unconditional.
The desirabilities of all (other) prospects, on the other hand, are conditioned by their relation to the
fundamental worlds; roughly by the extent to which they render each of the fundamental possibilities
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more or less likely.
Let   = fA;B; :::g denote }(
) and  0 denote }(
)   ?. A \ B will be shortened to AB. The
agents preferences over prospects are represented by a two-place relation  on  0 which we will assume
to be transitive, but not necessarily complete. The relations of strict preference, , and indi¤erence,
, are related to  in the usual way. Informally we may think of the agents preferences, and their
evolution over time, as providing the observations that require explanation.
The state of mind of an opinionated agent will be represented by a pair of real-valued functions
hp; vi, where p is a probability measure on   of her degrees of belief and v a normalised desirability
measure on  0 of her degrees of desire satisfying, for all X;Y 2  0 such that XY = ?:
(Normality) V (
) = 0
(Averaging) v(X [ Y ) = v(X):p(X) + v(Y ):p(Y )
p(X) + p(Y )
The states of mind of less opinionated agents can be represented by sets of such pairs. For simplicity,
however, we will work with a single pair at a time.
A state of mind hp; vi explains an agents preferences whenever it is the case that, for all X;Y in
the domain of :
X  Y ) v(X)  v(Y )
The more information we hold about an agents preferences, the more constraints they place on the
class of states of mind that explain them. Under certain assumptions about the preference relation 
- completeness and Bolkers averaging and impartiality conditions (see Bolker [3] and [4]) - both the
existence of a state of mind explaining someones preferences can be formally demonstrated and its
uniqueness up to particular class of transformations. Since we make weaker assumptions about the
nature of preferences, the existence of explanatory states of mind poses no problems here. They will
not typically be unique however and very di¤erent representations of the agents state of mind may be
consistent with what we know about her preferences, even if they satisfy all the aforementioned condi-
tions. To avoid the complications that this gives rise to, we will simply assume here that explanatory
state of minds are unique up to a choice of scale for measuring her degrees of desire. Indeed, since the
choice of zero has already been settled by the normalisation of v with respect to 
, the choice of unit
for v is the only remaining free parameter that we will need to worry about.
We assume throughout that 
 is countable and that all worlds have non-zero prior probability. In
this case we can express the probability and desirability of any X 2  0 in the following manner:
p(X) =
P
i2X
p(!i) (1)
v(X) =
P
i
v(!i):p(!ijX) (2)
These equations give formal expression to the idea that the agent will regard prospects as probable and
desirable to the degree that they render one or another fundamental state, with given prior probability
and desirability, more or less likely.
Changes of Mind Changes in an agents preferences are to be explained by changes in her state
of mind. In the models we consider below, a change in the agents state of mind is viewed as a two-step
process:
Stage 1 The agent changes her attitude to a particular prospect (or more generally across a partition of
the space of prospects).
Stage 2 She adjusts her attitudes to all other prospects in order to restore consistency.
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Formally a model of revision maps each prior opinionated state of mind, hp; vi, to a posterior one,
hp; vi, as a function of the constraints yielded by stage 1. The process inducing the initial change is
not itself modelled: these might include sensory experience, private or public deliberation, reception of
a message from a reliable information source, or even hypnosis.
Methodological Theses We are now in a position to express formally various theses of interest
concerning attitudes to fundamental states. Let hp; vi and hp; vi respectively be the prior and posterior
states of mind of an agent. Then for all !; !0 2 
 such that p(!); p(!0) > 0:
1. Invariance of Fundamental Desire (IFD): v(!) > v(!0), v(!) > v(!0)
2. Invariance of Fundamental Belief (IFB): p(!) > p(!0), p(!) > p(!0)
The rst thesis, IFD, is one half of Beckers methodological position on tastes. The second thesis,
IFB, is a parallel claim about fundamental beliefs and is central to classical Bayesian thinking. It is
these two theses, and particularly the rst, that will be investigated here. But it is worth noting that
for each of them there is a corresponding hypothesis about the universality of fundamental attitudes.
Let I = f1; :::; ng be a set of individual agents and hpi; vii be the state of mind of the ith member of I
at a given time. Then for all i; j 2 I and for all !; !0 2 
 such that pj(!); pj(!0); pi(!); pi(!0) > 0, one
might postulate that:
3. Universality of Fundamental Desire (UFD): vj(!)  vj(!0), vi(!)  vi(!0)
4. Universality of Fundamental Belief (UFB): pj(!)  pj(!0), pi(!)  pi(!0)
Universality theses, like the invariance ones, are commonly made on methodological or heuristic
grounds and can have very powerful consequences. Some examples: Aumanns use of a common prior
assumption (UFD) in his Agreeing to Disagree theorem; Harsanyis similarity postulate (UFB) to
support his derivation of Utilitarianism; and, of course, Beckers own use of universal tastes in his
explanation of cultural di¤erence. Although we shall not examine the universality theses here, much of
the discussion of the invariance ones carries over to them.
3 Classical Conditioning
Classical conditioning is a way of revising your attitudes when you learn that some proposition A is
true or receive the information that A. If an agent revises by classical conditioning on A then her new
attitudes are such that for all prospects X such that p(AX) 6= 0:
p(X) = p(XjA) = p(AX)
p(A)
[if p(A) 6= 0]
v(X) = v(XjA) = v(AX)  v(A) [if p(AX) 6= 0]
The functions p(jA) and v(jA) are, respectively, a probability measure and a desirability measure of the
agents degrees of conditional belief and conditional desire given the truth of A. An agents conditional
attitude to any prospect, given that A, is not the attitude she will have to it in the event that the
condition is realised or discovered to be true, but her current attitude to it on the supposition that A
is true. So what classical conditioning on the truth of A essentially consists in is the adoption of ones
current conditional attitudes, on the supposition that A, as ones new attitudes. Thus, if I currently
prefer taking white wine to red to a dinner party, conditional on the supposition that sh is to be served,
and red to white on the supposition that meat is to be, then once I have phoned my hosts and settled
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the issue of what we will be eating, I should simply adopt as my preferences over wine, the conditional
preference that was based on the correct supposition.
Revision by classical conditioning accords with IFB as it leaves the ordering induced by fundamental
beliefs unchanged upon receipt of the information. For if p(!jA); p(!0jA) > 0 then p(!jA)  p(!0jA),
p(!)  p(!0). Classical conditioning also accords with Beckers Thesis, as preferences amongst the
elements of the fundamental partition do not change. For if p(!); p(!0) > 0:
v(!jA) > v(!0jA)
, v(!)  v(A) > v(!0)  v(A)
, v(!) > v(!0)
Indeed, with one qualication, we can explicitly express the agents new state of mind in terms of her
old desirabilities plus her new degrees of belief. The qualication derives from the requirement that
the measure of the agents degrees of desire is normalised with respect to the set of fundamental states,

. Given the renormalisation factor k =
P
i v(!i):p
(!i), which roughly expresses the desirability gain
(relative to the agents prior expectations) derived from the truth of A, we have:
v(X) =
P
i
v(!i):p
(!ijX)  k
=
P
i
v(!i):p(!ijAX)  k
i.e. the agents new degrees of desire are obtained from her old by averaging her old fundamental
desires with her old conditional degrees of belief, given the new information that A. Or more pithily:
new degrees of desire are old conditional expectations, given new information, for old fundamental
desirability.
The Rigidity Condition Adopting p(jA) and v(jA) as your new degrees of belief and desires is
demonstrably the correct thing to do just in case your the e¤ect of interaction with the environment is
conned to your becoming certain of the truth of some prospect A, and your conditional desires, given
the truth of A, do not change as a result i.e. for all X 2  0 such that p(AX) 6= 0:
Certainty : p(A) = 1; v(A) = 0;
Rigidity : v(XjA) = v(XjA)
This is proved as Theorem 10 in Bradley [8]. We now show the equivalence of Rigidity to a couple of
other useful conditions (proof in the appendix).
Theorem 1 The following are equivalent:
(i) 8(X 2  0 : p(AX) 6= 0), v(BjA) = v(BjA);
(ii) 8(X 2  0 : p(AX) 6= 0), v(XA)  v(XA) = v(A)  v(A) and p(XA)p(XA) = p
(A)
p(A) ;
(iii) 8! 2 A, v(!)  v(!) = v(A)  v(A) and p(!)p(!) = p
(A)
p(A) .
The important question, of course, is whether and when we can expect these conditions to be
satised. Arguably Rigidity should hold whenever A describes all and everything that is learnt by the
agent as a result of interaction with the environment and all changes to the agents partial attitudes are
rational e¤ects of her learning that A. For suppose that the agents new conditional degrees of desire
given A were not the same as her old ones. Since the truth of A is not itself a reason to change ones
conditional desires given A, something more than A must have been learnt, such as that As being true
has previously unforeseen consequences. But that is contrary to the supposition that A is all that is
learnt.
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The notion of a reason for a change in attitude is left rather vague by this informal argument. It can
be sharpened however by showing that an agent whose conditional desires do not satisfy the Rigidity
condition under the imagined circumstances is vulnerable to a money pump. For the purposes of the
exercise let us suppose that the truth of prospects can be bought and sold in some market so that, in
an appropriate currency, v(X) and v(X) give the fair prices for the agent, before and after learning
that A, of the prospect of X. Suppose rstly that the agent commits herself to a revision policy in case
of learning that A such that for some X, v(XjA) 6= v(XjA). There are two cases:
i.) v(XjA) > v(XjA). In this case the agent can be sold the option of XA for v(XA) and the
option of A can be bought from her for v(A). Once the option of A has been exercised the option of
XA can be bought from the agent for v(XA). By assumption v(XA)  v(A) = v(XjA) > v(XjA) =
v(XA). So in this case she is v(XjA)  v(XjA) > 0 poorer.
ii) v(XjA) > v(XjA). In this case the option of XA can be bought from the agent for v(XA) and
the option of A sold for v(A). Once the option of A has been exercised the option of AX can sold back
to the agent for v(XA). By assumption v(XA) = v(XjA) > v(XjA) = v(XA)   v(A). So in this
case she is v(XA)  v(XA) + v(A) > 0 poorer.
It follows that in any case in which the agent commits to a revision policy that fails to satisfy the
Rigidity condition she will nd herself open to a sure loss.
Money pump arguments, like their close relatives the Dutch Book arguments, show that failure to
satisfy some condition or other renders the agent vulnerable to exploitation. It does not follow without
further argument that rigidity of conditional attitude is a requirement of rationality under the given
circumstances. After all one can render oneself invulnerable to money pumps by simply not declaring a
belief revision policy. Indeed this would seem to be a sensible precaution since there are cases in which
ones attitudes may change as a result of interaction with the environment but not (entirely) because of
the information that one acquires during it simply because the manner in which something is learnt has
some non-rational e¤ect on ones attitudes. If, for instance, one learns of the consequences of excessive
alcohol consumption by doing the drinking oneself or of the presence of a poisonous snake in the house
by standing on it, there is every possibility that other attitudes will be altered in the process and in
a manner not representable as a conditioning on what has been learnt. Unless the manner in which
information is acquired can be controlled somehow (as perhaps it is in scientic experiments), it would
be unwise to commit oneself to a revision policy in the manner required by the money-pump argument.
The Scope of Classical Conditioning The money-pump argument, as well as its informal
predecessor, really only succeeds if we restrict its application to cases in which learning that A is
the only immediate e¤ect of the interaction with the environment on ones state of mind. The cases
described in the previous paragraph suggest however that some revisions have non-informational roots
and consequently that they cannot be described in terms of learning the truth of some proposition. The
mark of attitude change of this kind is the failure of conditions akin to what van Fraassen [?] dubbed
the Reection Principle. Suppose that I learn somehow that I will come to adopt p(X) as my degree
of belief in X some time in the future. Then the Reection Principle requires me to adopt p(X) as
my current degree of belief in X as well. A similar condition on preference would require that one
adopts as ones current preferences any future preferences that one expects to acquire. Neither versions
are convincing as conditions of rationality, even though failure to satisfy them does in fact render one
vulnerable to either a Dutch Book or a Money Pump. Consider:
Example 2 A twenty-something socialist, seeing the truth in Briands claim that the man who is not
a socialist at twenty has no heart, but if he is still a socialist at forty he has no head, believes that
he will no longer believe in socialism when he is older. He does not however believe that his change in
belief will bring him nearer to the truth. On the contrary, he suspects that Briands observation is true
because of a natural capacity for rationalisation and self-justication that accompanies steady absorption
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into Bourgeois life and its material comforts. So he feels no compulsion to give up his socialist beliefs
now, even if he recognises that he will do so one day.
There is something tragic about the condition of someone who knows that her attitudes will change
for the worse, by her present lights. But given this, far from it being rational for to adopt her anticipated
attitudes, it would be positively irrational to do so. Reection principles only have force with respect to
future attitudes that one believes will be acquired by a reliable learning process such as conditioning on
information received. The fact that we do not regard such principles as universally binding shows that
we do not believe classical conditioning to exhaust the ways in which we change our mind. Consequently
to represent all belief change in terms of information acquisition requires that we regard such beliefs
about ourselves to be in error.
4 Je¤rey conditioning
Our discussion thus far has left open the question whether classical conditioning is the only form of belief
change that can be motivated in terms of what has been learnt from interaction with the environment.
There are reasons for thinking, however, that someones degree of belief in a particular proposition may
change with reason without them being sure of either its truth or falsehood and that:
probabilistic judgement may be appropriate as a direct response to experience, under-
ived from sure judgment that the experience is of such and such a character.[10, p. 45].
Example 3 I overhear a conversation in a foreign language and from the sounds of words and the
mannerisms of the speakers I conclude that they are most likely, say, Spanish, but perhaps Catalan or
even French. They seem to be assenting to each others remarks by utterances of si, but perhaps I
am mishearing. Could the si be the French denial of a negated assertion? There is no hope here of
producing a sentence that summarises all and only the facts learnt (and believed with probability one)
in the encounter. Relevant evidence is not entirely indubitable, many of the cues never make it into
consciousness (and perhaps cannot) and I dont have well-dened conditional degrees of belief for the
speakers language, given the bits of evidence that do.
In circumstances in which the agents degrees of belief over some partition of prospect space changes,
without her being certain of the truth of any one of the elements of it, the natural generalisation of
classical conditioning is a form of revision called Je¤rey conditioning. If an agent revises by Je¤rey
conditioning on a partition fAig then her new attitudes are such that for all prospects X :
p(X) =
P
i
p(XjAi):p(Ai)
v(X) =
P
i
v(XAi):p
(AijX)  k
where, as before, k =
P
i v(!i):p
(!i) =
P
i v(Ai):p
(Ai) is a renormalisation term required to ensure
that v(
) = 0.
Revision by Je¤rey conditioning satises IFD, since preferences amongst the elements of the funda-
mental partition do not change. For:
v(!) > v(!0),Pi v(!):p(Aij!) >Pi v(!0):p(Aij!0), v(!) > v(!0)
Indeed once again we can explicitly express the agents new state of mind in terms of her old desirabilities
(up to normalisation) plus her new degrees of belief:
v(X) =
P
i v(!i):p
(!ijX)  k
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i.e. the agents new degrees of desire are obtained from her old by averaging her old fundamental desires
with her new degrees of beliefs. Or more pithily: new degrees of desire are new expectations for old
fundamental desirability.
On the other hand, fundamental belief change is not ruled out in this model of preference revision
and there may be no sense in which the agents new degrees of belief are derived from her old. In-
stead posterior belief is obtained by averaging the new partition probabilities with the old conditional
probabilities given each element of it.
The Scope of Je¤rey Conditioning Je¤rey conditioning on the partition fAig is demonstrably
rational whenever the Stage 1 constraint on revision is exhausted by the requirement that p(A1) = a1,
p(A2) = a2, etc., and this redistribution of belief leaves the agents degrees of conditional desires given
the Ai unchanged i.e. whenever the Rigidity condition applies to all the Ai. A proof of this claim is
given in Bradley [8]. But why should an agents conditional desires given the Ai not change when her
degrees of belief for the Ai do? We can extend our earlier Money Pump argument to this more general
case of probabilistic updating to provide the answer.
Consider a two-stage revision process. At the rst stage, interaction with the environment induces
the agent to adopt new probabilities for the elements of the partition fAig, without the probability
of any one of them going to one. In the second stage the agent learns which of the Ai is the truth.
Suppose that this process leads to a transformation of her state of mind from hp; vi to hp; vi and
then to hp; vi. By our previous argument for Rigidity in the context of classical conditioning,
v(jAi) = v(jAi) and v(jAi) = v(jAi), since both the revisions from hp; vi to hp; vi and that
from hp; vi to hp; vi fall under its scope. It follows that v(jAi) = v(jAi) for any of the Ai and
hence that the Rigidity condition holds for pure probabilistic shifts as well.
As before this argument presupposes that the initial impact of interaction with the environment
is conned to changes to the agents degrees of belief over the relevant partition. If there are any
additional e¤ects on the agents desires that are by-products of the manner in which she acquires
uncertain evidence about the elements of the partition, then her conditional desires given the Ai may
change, as presumably might be the case in the examples given before. Given this possibility it is unwise
to declare a belief revision strategy unless the manner in which the uncertain evidence is acquired can
be controlled.
On the other hand the scope of the money-pump argument for Je¤rey conditioning is far greater
than that for classical conditioning. For it is not only cases of receipt of uncertain evidence that can
be represented by redistributions of probability over some denite partition, but a great many others
including those involving receipt of probabilistic or conditional information (see Bradley [?]). It also
extends to the kinds of cases we discussed before involving the breakdown of reection principles,
because the interaction with the environment inducing the redistribution of probabilities need not be
interpreted in informational terms. In fact any revision of probabilities dened on a countable set of
propositions and not involving assignment of probability to prospects with zero prior probability can
be represented as an instance of Je¤rey conditioning on some partition satisfying the Rigidity condition
(see van Fraassen [14] and Diaconis and Zabell [9] for further discussion of this feature).2
Taste and Value Change Signicant though it may be that all belief change is representable
in terms of Je¤rey conditioning, it does not settle the question of whether all preference change can
represented in these terms. On the face of it the answer is no, for there are cases of preference revisions
that seem to involve pure taste or value changes. Examples include cases of conditioning or cultivation
of taste by habituation - e.g. weaning infants onto cows milk or acquiring a taste for olives - and cases
2The restriction to cases not involving assignment of positive probability to prospects previously regarded as certainly
false is for technical reasons alone. The restriction could be dropped if Popper-Renyi conditional probability functions
were used for measuring conditional belief.
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of value discovery - e.g. when you learn that relationships require discretion as well as honesty, or that
red wine is best drunk with cheese. In habituation cases repeated experience of something leads to a
re-evaluation of it (typically unconsciously) despite the fact that any informational gains are made only
in the early repetitions. One can grow tired of a foodstu¤, for instance, not because of anything one
learns about it, but simply because of the jading of ones palate. In cases of value discovery, some kind
of learning is involved, but it seems to be of a di¤erent nature to that involved in the improvement of
belief. When one learns that a particular wine is a good companion to a particular cheese (perhaps
contrary to prior expectations), one does of course learn something about the two products. But what
one learns about them is how they stand in relation to ones tastes; a discovery that must give rise to
an improved evaluation of the products in combination, before it gives rise to a new (and improved)
belief about them.
As in the case of belief change, recognition of the possibility of taste change without an informational,
or indeed credal, source is implicit in the choices we make. And again the mark of this is the violation
of a reection principle; in this case the requirement that anticipation of future desire change should
lead to the adoption of the anticipated desire. Consider:
Example 4 A chocolate lover prefers to eat only a small amount of chocolate after dinner each day
because of the impact on her health of excessive chocolate consumption. Chocolate could be bought in bulk
once a week or in small quantities on a daily basis. Despite the fact that the latter is both more expensive
and time-consuming she prefers to buy daily, because she knows that if she has a lot of chocolate available
she will not conne herself to eating a small quantity of it.
This example, like that of the twenty-something socialist, involves an expectation of attitude changes
that are not endorsed by the person expecting to undergo them. But this time it is the expected increase
in her desire for chocolate, not a belief change, that would seem to motivate the choice of the more
costly action. Unless we are deluded about the attitude changes we can undergo, the evidence is that
not all preference revision can be described in terms of Je¤rey conditioning.
5 Generalised conditioning
The most general of the types of attitude revision to be considered is what I call generalised conditioning.
This is a form of revision that is appropriate when the e¤ects of interaction with the environment can be
represented by a redistribution of probability and desirability over some particular partition fAig of the
space of prospects, so that the Stage 1 constraint takes the form of the requirement that p(A1) = x1,
p(A2) = x2, ..., v(A1) = y1, v(A2) = y2 etc.,. In which case her new attitudes are such that for all
prospects X:
p(X) =
X
i
p(XjAi):p(Ai)
v(X) =
X
i
[v(XjAi) + v(Ai)]:p(AijX)
Revision by generalised conditioning can violate both IFB and IFD and revision of both fundamental
belief and fundamental desire is allowed. Consequently posterior belief and desire is not derivable from
prior belief and desire. As in Je¤rey conditioning, posterior probabilities are obtained by averaging
the new probabilities for the elements of the base partition with the old conditional probabilities given
these elements. Similarly, the posterior desirability of each prospect X is obtained by averaging the
new desirabilities for the elements of the partition fXAig, where these are obtained from the new
desirabilities of the Ai - given by Stage 1 - and the old conditional desirabilities of X given the Ai.
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Generalised conditioning is demonstrably valid given the assumed Stage 1 constraints when the
agents conditional desirabilities, given the Ai, remain invariant i.e. whenever the Rigidity condition
applies to all the Ai. This is proved as Lemma 22 in Bradley [8]. In this case moreover the Money-pump
argument given in the previous section applies without restriction, because the Stage 1 conditions for the
application of generalised conditioning rule out the possibility of any attitude change as a by-product
on the interaction (assuming these conditions are exhaustive). This makes for a strong case in favour
of the Rigidity condition within the postulated conditions of application.
Assuming that generalised conditioning is rational under the assumed circumstances, we can now ask
to what extent preference change can be modelled in these terms. Both the phenomenon of habituation
and that of value learning are amenable to modelling in terms of generalised conditioning, despite the
fact that the processes inducing them may be quite di¤erent in nature. In fact, somewhat surprisingly,
it turns out that all preference revision can be modelled as generalised conditioning. This is the message
of the main theorem of the paper, which follows.
Theorem 5 Let hp; vi and hp; vi be respectively an agents prior and posterior states of mind. Then
there exists some partition of 
 such that hp; vi is obtained from hp; vi by generalised conditioning on
this partition.
Theorem 5 shows that it is always possible to represent a change in an agents state of mind as an
instance of generalised conditioning on some partition of the space of prospects, even when changes
in fundamental desires are involved. In this sense it gives a completely general framework for the
representation of preference change. It does not follow that the explanation of any instance of preference
change in terms of generalised conditioning is the only possible one or even the best one. Interaction
with the environment could leave the agent with new conditional desires which she then uses as a basis
for adjusting her unconditional ones e.g. when tasting di¤erent combinations of wine and cheese leads
to new conditional preferences for the wines given the cheeses. But it does show that any such change
would be equivalent to generalised conditioning on some partition; in our example this would most
likely be the partition of wine-cheese pairs.
6 Reducibility to Belief Change
In this nal section we return to the assessment of our version of Beckers methodological hypothesis;
namely that it is possible to explain all preference change in terms of changes in belief against the
backdrop of invariant fundamental desires. I have given what I take to be strong arguments against the
possibility of doing so if belief change is construed in purely informational terms. But it is less clear that
it is impossible to do so if we equip ourselves with the full resources of the Je¤rey conditioning models. It
may be possible to describe what was previously identied as instances of pure taste change - habituation
and value learning - in terms of changes in beliefs concerning factors determining the desirability of
the prospects in question. Becker himself is a master of such redescriptions as is evidenced by his
explanation of addiction (a habituation phenomenon) in terms of changes in stocks of personal capital
and hence expectations about the benets of consumption that derive from them, and of advertising-
induced taste change (an instance of value learning) in terms of changes in the shadow prices of the
advertised goods, themselves consequences of changes in the agents beliefs about the properties of these
goods (see Becker [1]).
My own view is that it is indeed often possible to describe a given instance of preference change
either in terms of a belief change or a taste change (or both) and that which of these is correct is
underdetermined by the evidence we can bring to bear on the task. Consider, for instance, our previous
examples of the chocolate lover and of the twenty-something socialist. In both, there is some ambiguity
as to whether it is belief changes or value/desire changes that are involved. The change from socialist
may be as much a matter of a change in values, or weight given to certain values, as changes in beliefs
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about the consequences of socialism. Equally it may be possible to explain the purchasing habits of the
chocolate lover either in terms of an expectation that consuming chocolate will increase the strength
of her desire to consume more, or in terms an expectation that consuming chocolate will change her
beliefs about the consequences of so doing for her health.
This raises the question of whether the option of explaining a preference change in terms of changes
in belief is always available. Clearly the answer is no when we work with a xed countable algebra of
prospects, as we have in this paper. For a revision of the desirabilities of the fundamental states cannot
be derived from a belief revision on some more rened partition (since there is no such partition). On
the other hand, if one is allowed to rene the space of fundamental states at will, then it seems likely
that it will always be possible to satisfy Beckers demand for explanations based on invariant tastes. But
rening the state space can be as ad hoc from a methodological point of view as postulating changes in
fundamental desires and I see little to recommend it as a general strategy for explaining away apparent
taste changes.
If a su¢ ciently rened space of fundamental states is picked, however, then it is possible that for
many of the cases of preference change that are actually observed, it will be possible to formulate an
explanation in terms of underlying belief changes. To state more precisely the conditions under which
such an explanation will be available suppose that we observe a change in the agents preferences over
some partition of the state space only and that our representation of the agents new state of mind is
constrained by the information we hold about them to no greater extent than determining a measure of
her degrees of belief and desire over the power set of this partition. (Of course if we hold less information
about the agents new state of mind then it becomes easier to formulate an explanation in terms of
belief change that is consistent with the known facts). In this case the kind of explanation we seek will
be available whenever the following condition on the agents postulated fundamental preferences over
the partition is satised.
Condition 6 (Richness) Let fAig be a partition of 
 and  a strict preference relation on 
. Then
hfAig;i satises the richness condition i¤ there exists, for all Ai, !gi ; !bi 2 Ai such that !gi  
  !bi .
Theorem 7 Let an agents prior state of mind be represented by hp; vi and suppose that the agents
degrees of belief and desire for the elements of a partition fAig, satisfying the richness condition, are
observedto change from v(Ai) and p(Ai) to v(Ai) and p(Ai). Then there exists a representation of
her posterior state of mind probability hp; vi such that:
v(Ai) =
X
!j2

v(!j):p
(!j jAi)  k
where k =
P
i v(Ai):p
(Ai).
Theorem 7 shows that in some fairly typical set of conditions it will be possible to give an expla-
nation of an observed preference change in terms of a change in underlying fundamental beliefs. These
conditions are, on the one hand, that the preference change should have occurred over a relatively
coarse-grained set of prospects, each of which has both good and bad potential conditions of realisation
and, on the other hand, that we hold less than full information about the agents new state of mind.
Like Theorem 5, Theorem 7 is a possibility result; a result that show what sorts of explanations of
preference change are open to us. Possibility results dont settle the question of desirability; of whether
an explanation should be o¤ered in on form or another. There are a number of criteria that one can
appeal to in assessing the appeal of an explanation: empirical content, simplicity and plausibility are all
surely relevant. For my part, I doubt that these criteria will always favour explanations that assume xed
fundamental tastes. The sorts of suppositions that will need to be made about changes to underlying
beliefs in order to preserve the invariance of tastes may well be as ad hoc as the assumptions about taste
changes that they are supposed to replace, and may be no more constrained by the empirical evidence.
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Explanation of behaviour is in part a matter of tting what we observe into recognisable patterns, and
in this respect there are intelligible patterns of taste change just as much as there are of belief change.
7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
(i) , (ii): From the denition of conditional desirability (equation 2) it follows immediately that:
v(XjA) = v(XjA), v(AX)  v(AX) = v(A)  v(A)
And by Lemma 21 of Bradley [8], if v(XjA) = v(XjA) then p(XjA) = p(XjA). Hence 8X 2  :
p(AX)
p(AX)
=
p(A)
p(A)
(3)
(ii) ) (iii): Suppose that 8X 2  ; v(AX)   v(AX) = v(A)   v(A) and p(AX)p(AX) = p
(A)
p(A) . Then it
follow that, in particular, 8! 2 A, v(!)  v(!) = v(A)  v(A) and p(!)=p(!) = p(A)=p(A).
(iii) ) (i): Now assume that 8! 2 A, v(!)   v(!) = v(A)   v(A) and p(!)=p(!) = p(A)=p(A).
Then 8X 2  :
v(XjA) = v(AX)  v(A)
=
P
!2AX
v(!):p(!)
p(AX)
  v(A)
=
P
!2AX
(v(!)  v(A) + v(A)):p(!)
p(AX)
  v(A)
=
P
!2AX
v(!):p(!)
p(AX)
  v(A)
=
P
!2AX
v(!):p(!)
p(AX)
  v(A)
= v(AX)  v(A)
= v(XjA)
Proof of Theorem 5. Let R := fi 2 < : v(!)   v(!) = i;8! 2 
g and S := fj 2 < :
p(!)=p(!) = j; 8! 2 
g. Then let Aij := f! 2 
 : v(!)  v(!) = i; p(!)=p(!) = j; 8i 2 R; j 2 Sg, so
that the Aij partition the set of fundamental worlds into equivalences classes of worlds with identical
di¤erences in prior and posterior desirabilities and ratios of prior and posterior probabilities. Now by
the denition of conditional desirability and equation (2):
v(XjAij) = v(XjAij)  v(Aij)
=
P
!2XAij
v(!):p(!)
p(XAij)
  P
!2Aij
v(!):p(!)
p(Aij)
=
P
!2XAij
(v(!) + i):j:p(!)
p(XAij)
  P
!2Aij
(v(!) + i):j:p(!)
p(Aij)
But by equation (1):
p(XAij) =
P
!2XAij
p(!) =
P
!2XAij
j:p(!) = j:p(XAij)
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So:
v(XjAij) =
P
!2XAij
(v(!) + i):j:p(!)
j:p(XAij)
  P
!2Aij
(v(!) + i):j:p(!)
j:p(Aij)
=
P
!2XAij
v(!):p(!)
p(XAij)
  P
!2Aij
v(!):p(!)
p(Aij)
= v(XjAij)  v(Aij)
= v(XjAij)
Hence the Rigidity condition applies to the elements of fAig. It follows immediately that hp; vi is
obtained from hp; vi by generalised conditioning on fAig.
Proof of Theorem 7. We prove the theorem by constructing hp; vi from hp; vi and the v(Ai)
and p(Ai). For any Ai let !
g
i ; !
b
i 2 Ai be such that !gi  
  !bi . Dene:
k =
P
i v(Ai):p
(Ai)
p(!gi jAi) =
v(Ai)  v(!bi ) + k
v(!gi )  v(!bi )
p(!bi jAi) = 1  p(!gi jAi)
and 8! 2 Ai   f!gi ; !big; p(!jAi) = 0. Then:
v(Ai) = v(!
g
i ):p
(!gi jAi) + v(!bi ):p(!bi jAi)  k
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